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We have always known that some form of clock is
needed to measure time. It now seems that a variety
of different neural clocks are involved in determining
our temporal perceptions, some specialised for
shorter and some for longer durations.
Immanuel Kant tried to explain the special status 
of time and space in perception by arguing that our
understanding of the universe is limited by the way 
our brains process information. Specifically, he noted
that we perceive all events as occurring in time and
space, but it is not clear whether these dimensions
exist in reality or are byproducts of our mental organ-
isation [1]. For the neuroscientist, the question is
slightly different: allowing that our perceptions are
mental constructs and therefore often differ from, or
ignore, physical reality (illusions for example), the ques-
tion becomes how do brain structures and processes
shape these perceptions. Within most sensory modal-
ities there is a clear starting point because the dimen-
sions being examined — size, colour, pitch, pressure
and so on — can be measured using known receptor
systems. For time, it is less clear how to approach the
issue as we do not appear to have a set of peripheral
time sensors or a primary time area. So how do we
come to be aware of time, and what mechanisms do
we use to measure it?
Psychologists and physiologists have been investi-
gating time measurement since the early 17th century.
Approaches they have used fall into two main cate-
gories: examination of the psychophysical properties
of temporal estimation data, and investigations aiming
to isolate the necessary brain regions using focal
lesions or, more recently, neuroimaging. An important
fundamental concept which has emerged from this
work is that of multiple neural clocks (Figure 1). Mea-
surement of intervals with different durations, or for
different behavioural purposes, appears to draw upon
quite discrete mechanisms in many cases. A recent
neuropsychological study [2] has provided further
support for this notion that time perception involves
multiple neural clocks.
Take, for example, the circadian pacemaker, which
measures 24 hour cycles. This clock has been shown
to depend on the integrity of the suprachiasmatic
nucleus (SCN) of the hypothalamus [3], and appears to
be distinct from the clock systems used to measure
shorter intervals, such as ultradian activity cycles,
which are commonly around 2 hours in the small
rodents studied [4]. Lesions to the SCN fully abolish
circadian rhythmicity, but do not perturb the ultradian
pattern. Instead, ultradian rhythms are eliminated by
lesions to other regions of the hypothalamus, the par-
aventricular and retrochiasmatic structures, suggest-
ing that the clock mechanism may be housed in or at
least connected via these areas. Similarly, the mea-
surement of brief durations in the range of hundreds
of milliseconds to multiple seconds appears to be
completely independent of the hypothalamus, involv-
ing cerebral cortex as well as subcortical structures
used in motor control [5].
Even within the range of hundreds of milliseconds to
multiple seconds, it is likely that different timers are
used for measurement of different durations [2,6–8].
Gibbon et al. [7], for example, suggest that the relative
precision of temporal estimates varies in a predictable
way, with subjects measuring time with a low relative
standard deviation (coefficient of variation) in some
duration ranges, and a much higher coefficient of vari-
ation in others. They propose that these varied levels
of precision may be due to the use of different mecha-
nisms. Using quite a different approach, Richard Ivry
and colleagues [6] have shown that lesions to the cere-
bellum perturb the measurement of sub-second but
not longer intervals, suggesting this structure’s involve-
ment in timing at the short end of the scale alone.
Thomas Rammsayer [8] has proposed a framework
which encapsulates not only Gibbon’s and Ivry’s data,
but also his own work showing that pharmacological
manipulations can perturb the measurement of sub-
second and longer intervals differentially. He suggests
that briefer intervals are timed at a sub-cognitive level
by parts of the motor system, while longer intervals
are timed using cognitive processes such as working
memory and attention [8]. Evidence supporting this
view is rapidly emerging from new work using 
neuroimaging techniques, and suggests that the right
hemispheric prefrontal and parietal areas are critical
for measurement of supra-second intervals, while the
motor cortex and sub-cortical components of the
motor system, such as the basal ganglia and cerebel-
lum, are involved in measuring briefer intervals.
This proposed distinction between cognitively con-
trolled and more automatic timing systems roughly
parallels a similar distinction between ‘intentional’ and
‘automatic’ forms of memory [9]. If these frameworks
are correct, both timing and memory may draw upon
a common strategy in cognitive functions — that is,
non-conscious automatic mechanisms are used to
perform these tasks in more frequent or less demand-
ing circumstances, but the flexible memory and atten-
tion modules of the prefrontal and parietal cortices
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can be recruited as alternative systems for tasks
falling outside the scope of these more automatic
algorithms.
In a recent study supporting the suggestion of mul-
tiple clocks, Kargerer et al. [2] examined neuropsy-
chological patients’ ability to reproduce intervals
ranging from 1 to 5.5 seconds. Subjects experienced
each interval, presented as either an auditory or visual
stimulus, and then reproduced it by terminating a
second presentation in the same modality at the
correct time. The results show overproduction of inter-
vals shorter than three seconds and underproduction
of intervals longer than three seconds, leading to
comparative accuracy at the ‘transition zone’ in
between. This effect was observed in both patient and
control groups. Patients with right hemispheric
damage in the frontal cortex performed significantly
worse than controls on the longer intervals, greatly
underestimating these although their results appeared
normal at the shorter range. This finding supports
both the possibility that different mechanisms are
used in measurement of intervals greater and less
than about three seconds and the prior literature sug-
gesting that cortical involvement in these tasks is
largely right lateralised, and that the frontal cortex
plays a critical role (see [4] for review). The most novel
aspect of the finding is that this holds true for the
longish intervals ranging from 3 to 5.5 second dura-
tions, which neither lesion studies nor the neuroimag-
ing literature have examined extensively.
Kargerer et al. [2] emphasise that the difference in
slope observed for estimates of intervals shorter than 3
versus longer than 3.5 seconds (as shown in Figure 2B)
may also suggest a duality of mechanisms. This inter-
pretation should perhaps be treated with caution as
perceptual judgements in many different domains,
including time, size, weight, intensity and so forth,
have been shown to gravitate toward a mean magni-
tude in the range examined [10]. Hence, stimuli below
the mean tend to be overestimated and stimuli above
it to be underestimated in a pattern very similar to that
observed by Kargerer et al. [2]. Stimuli at the transition
zone or ‘indifference point’, as it has been called in
earlier work, show no constant error (Figure 2A). 
This effect was actually first observed for temporal
estimates in 1864 [11] and the results were interpreted
in a way very similar to those of Kargerer et al.’s [2], as
suggesting the existence of different temporal mech-
anisms, or that a single temporal mechanism might
have a preferred period. The flurry of ensuing experi-
mentation, however, established that the indifference
point varies in location from study to study, individual
to individual and ‘attentive state’ to attentive state,
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Figure 1.
Different brain areas are believed to be
involved in measurement of temporal
intervals at different ranges. While the
suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) of the
hypothalamus is known to be involved in
the measurement of 24 hour (circadian)
cycles, the paraventricular (PVN) and
retrochiasmatic (RCN) areas of the same
structure are thought to be involved in
measuring ultradian cycles of around
2 hours. For intervals of briefer duration:
some evidence supports the involvement
of right hemispheric prefrontal and pari-
etal cortex in measurement of multi-
second durations, while the cerebellum
and motor cortex are often involved in
measurement of sub-second intervals.
The basal ganglia may be involved in both
multi and sub-second systems.
Hypothalamus
SCN: circadian
timer (24 hours)
PVN;RCN:
ultradian timer
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Cerebellum
Parietal cortex
Basal Ganglia:
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Figure 2.
(A) A diagram illustrating the tendency to overestimate brief
durations, underestimate long durations, and to estimate mean
durations with comparative accuracy (the so-called ‘indiffer-
ence point’). Adapted from Boring [11]. (B) A schematic repre-
sentation of Kargerer et al.’s [2] data showing a similar pattern
to that described in (A). Target intervals are shown on the X axis,
error in estimates is shown on the Y axis. The excessive under-
estimation of short intervals by subjects with right hemispheric
frontal lesions is also depicted.
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and depends upon the range of intervals examined
(see [11] for a review). Because of these data, the old
notion that the indifference point may provide infor-
mation about the underlying mechanisms for time
measurement was eventually set aside [10].
The emerging picture of various independent clocks
raises several questions. Do these discrete timers
interact? Is it important that they stay ‘in sync’ with
each other, and if so, is there a primary timer by which
they are all somehow set? The existing evidence sug-
gests that, although they are independent in some
ways, these mechanisms interact in others. For
instance, it has been shown that the periods of circa-
dian and ultradian pacemakers are not linked, as alter-
ations in the circadian period do not lead to alterations
in the ultradian period [3], but that the mechanisms do
interact as the ultradian cycle appears to be reset by
each circadian dawn [12]. At the level of shorter dura-
tions, the relationship is less clear: experimental work
has shown that eliminating circadian rhythmicity via
focal lesion to the SCN does not perturb the measure-
ment of either a one second [13] or a ten second [14]
interval, but the possibility that the clock mechanisms
used for these judgements might be reset in some
way by the circadian period has yet to be examined.
Indeed, it is doubtful that the timers used to measure
these intervals involve a pacemaker which could be
reset in this way.
Many challenges remain in this field. Foremost are
questions about the precise locations, methods of
function, and varieties of mechanisms available to
measure time. These are closely followed by questions
about how the different mechanisms influence one
another. As for the philosophical question raised by
Kant — only time, and continued investigation, will tell.
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